Chapter VII: Demands For Reparation—Japanese Proposal To Close The Ports—Payment Of The Indemnity (1863)¶

1A very complete account of the murder of Richardson, and the failure of the Japanese Government to afford satisfactory redress either for that injury or for the attack on the Legation in June, had been sent home to the Foreign Office, and in March 1863 Colonel Neale received instructions to demand ample reparation from both the Tycoon and the Prince of Satsuma. 2On the 6^th April he sent Eusden up to Yedo on board the gunboat "Havoc" to deliver a Note, demanding the payment of £10,000 in gold for the wives and families of Sweet and Crimp, an ample apology for the other affair, and the payment of £100,000 as a penalty on the Tycoon for allowing an Englishman to be murdered in his territory in open daylight without making any effort to arrest the murderers. 3He warned the Council that refusal would be attended with very deplorable consequences to their country, and gave them twenty days to consider their reply. 4This lengthened period was allowed on account of the absence of the Tycoon and his chief advisers, who had left for Kiôto on the 3^rd. 5If at the conclusion of the term allotted no answer was returned, or an unsatisfactory one was given, coercive measures would immediately be taken. 6It was also intended that on the return of the "Havoc" from Yedo, the "Pearl" should be despatched to Kagoshima to demand of the Prince of Satsuma the trial and execution of the murderers of Richardson in the presence of one or more English officers, and the payment of £25,000 to be distributed to the relatives of Richardson, to Marshall, Clarke and Mrs Borradaile.

7On the 10^th Eusden came back from Yedo, bringing a receipt for the note and a refusal on the part of the Council to send an officer down to Kagoshima to advise the Prince of Satsuma to admit the demands to be made upon him. 8So the idea of despatching the "Pearl" was abandoned for the 739 moment, as it was impossible to foretell whether the Council would give in. 10If they were obstinate, reprisals would at once, it was thought, be commenced, and all our available force would be required to coerce the Tycoon's people. 11Satsuma must be left to be dealt with afterwards. 12So the Colonel waited until the 26^th. 13By the 24^th April we had in the harbour the "Euryalus," 35 guns, bearing the flag of Admiral Küper, the "Pearl," 21 guns, "Encounter," 14 (commanded by the brave Roderick Dew), "Rattler," 17, "Argus," 6, "Centaur," 6, and 3 gunboats. 14The despatch boats "Racehorse" and "Ringdove" were employed in travelling backwards and forwards between Yokohama and Shanghai with the mails, and the "Coquette" was daily expected from Hongkong.

15But as was to be anticipated, the Council begged for further delay. 16They asked for thirty days, and Colonel Neale gave them fifteen.

17My teacher Takaoka, who had private relations with the yashiki of the Prince of Ki-shiû, said they had never expected to get more than a fortnight, and as they felt certain the English Chargé d' Affaires would cut down their demands, they asked for double. 18He believed that the only motive for the delay was to gain time for preparation, and that war was certain. 19In the native quarter it was rumoured that the English had asked for the delay, which had been graciously granted by the Council; otherwise we should have been attacked the very day after the term elapsed. 20The inhabitants of Yedo expected war, and began to remove their valuables into the country. 21Young Kotarô had been carried off by his mama about the 20^th. 22At Uraga, the little junk-port just outside the entrance to the bay of Yedo, there was a panic, and the people were said to have decamped with all their movable property to Hodogaya on the Tôkaidô. 23On the other hand, there was some alarm felt in the foreign settlement. 24Meetings were held at which resolutions were passed to the effect that it was the duty of the executive to provide for the safety of the European residents. 25At the same time the merchants declared their intention of not leaving the settlement unless specially called on to do so by Colonel Neale, as they believed that if they deserted their property without such an order, they would not be able to recover its value afterwards in the event of its being destroyed. 26The precedent of the opium surrendered to Captain Elliot, the 741 British Superintendent of Trade at Canton in 1839, was of course in their minds, and they acted prudently in throwing the responsibility on the authorities.

2On the 1^st May the Council asked for another delay of fifteen days. 3Eusden was sent up to Yedo with a message to the Council that before the Colonel could grant their request they must send down to Yokohama one of their number to receive an important communication which he had to make to them. 4The native population now began to be seriously alarmed, and the shopkeepers of Kanagawa removed their effects to Hodogaya so as to be out of reach of a bombardment, and to secure a further retreat into the interior, if necessary, by the cross-country paths. 5The 2^nd of May was the last day on which the Yokohama people were permitted by the native authorities to send away their property to Yedo. 6The government circulated a sensible proclamation from door to door telling them not to be alarmed as there would be no war. 7At the same time notice was served on the peasants within two miles of Yokohama to be prepared to give up their houses to the troops, but as yet no soldiers had appeared on the scene.

8On the 4^th and 5^th May long conferences took place between the English and French representatives and Admirals and two Commissioners for Foreign Affairs, Takémoto Kai no Kami and Takémoto Hayato no Shô, who had been deputed by the Council to explain the reasons why a further delay was necessary. 9They probably represented that the difficulty in acceding to the English demands arose from the opposition of the daimiôs, for it seems that an offer was made to them that the English and French forces should assist the Tycoon to quell the resistance of the anti-foreign party, in order to enable him to carry out the promises to which he was bound by treaty. 10They offered, it was reported, to pay the money indemnity, disguising it under the ingenious fiction of payment for a man-of-war ordered in England, and wrecked on its way out. 11Finally an extension of time was accorded until the 23^rd of May, in order that the personal consent of the Tycoon, who was expected to return by that date, might be obtained to the English ultimatum.

12I rode out to Hodogaya on the afternoon of the 5^th and met the train of the wife of a daimiô going westwards, but saw very few armed men other than those who accompanied her. 13A rumour had got about that 10,000 men were in the 751 village and its neighbourhood, but the report was obviously without foundation.

6On the 11^th my teacher told me that a messenger had come to him from Yedo, sent by a personage of high rank, who desired to learn confidentially the intentions of the English Chargé d'Affaires, and whether he was disposed to await the return of the Tycoon, which would not be for three or four months, before taking hostile measures. 7In that case the high personage, who was superior in rank to the Council, would agree to issue a proclamation that a delay of a thousand days had been agreed upon, which would have the effect of restoring tranquillity at Yokohama. 8That if Colonel Neale, getting tired of these repeated delays, should change the seat of the negotiations to Ozaka, the high personage would have to perform hara-kiri, which he rather wished to avoid, as a penalty for failing to induce the foreigner to listen to his representations. 9I communicated this to Colonel Neale, and the reply sent was that he could not consent to wait so long as three months.

10The Council had announced the return of the Tycoon for the 24^th May, and Colonel Neale had replied that under the circumstances he would give time for "His Majesty's" settling down again at home, but on the 16^th a note was received from them stating that circumstances had arisen which prevented their fixing any date whatever for his arrival at Yedo. 11This seemed to point to an indefinite postponement of a settlement, but the Colonel's patience was not even yet exhausted. 12This accorded with what my teacher had told me. 13The high personage turned out to be the Prince of Owari. 14Takaoka now said that having transmitted Colonel Neale's answer to Kiôto, he would no longer be under the necessity of committing suicide, as he had been able to show that he was not responsible for the foreigner's obstinacy.

15Up to the 16^th the general feeling was that the Council 771 would give way, but the demand for a further postponement of the Japanese answer did not tend to encourage the hope of a peaceful settlement. 2A Japanese friend told me that the Tycoon could not by any means accept the assistance of foreign powers against the daimiôs, and that the abolition of the Mikado's dignity was impracticable. 3If we attacked Satsuma the Tycoon and daimiôs would be bound to make common cause with him. 4I suppose the idea of the foreign diplomatic representatives at that time was to support the Tycoon, whose claim to be considered the sovereign of Japan had already been called in question by Rudolph Lindau in his "Open Letter" of 1862, against the anti-foreign party consisting of the Mikado and daimiôs, and if necessary to convert him into something more than a mere feudal ruler. 5For we had as yet no idea of the immense potency that lay in the mere name of the sovereign de jure, and our studies in Japanese history had not yet enabled us to realize the truth that in the civil wars of Japan the victory had as a rule rested with the party that had managed to obtain possession of the person of the Mikado and the regalia. 6There has probably never been any sovereign in the world whose title has rested upon so secure a basis as that of the ancient emperors of Japan.

7On the 25^th another conference took place between the English and French diplomatic and naval authorities on the one side, and Takémoto Kai no Kami and a new man named Shibata Sadatarô on the other. 8The latter began by thanking the foreign representatives in the name of the Tycoon for their offer of material assistance, which he was, however, compelled to decline, as he must endeavour to settle the differences between the daimiôs and himself by his own unaided forces and authority. 9As to the indemnity, the Tycoon's government recognized that the demand was just, but they were afraid to pay immediately, as their yielding would bring the daimiôs down upon them. 10But they offered to pay the money by instalments in such a manner as not to attract public notice, and the further discussion of the details was put off to a future occasion. 11Probably Colonel Neale did not care very much how the matter was arranged, provided he could show to Her Majesty's Government that he had carried out his instructions. 12So the basis of an understanding was arrived at, and it was further conceded that the foreign representatives, that is those of England and 781 France, should take measures to defend Yokohama from attack by the anti-foreign party.

2Colonel Neale had written to Major-General Brown, who was in command at Shanghai, applying for a force of two thousand men, but a despatch now arrived from the general stating his inability and objections to furnishing any troops. 3It was said that he had ridiculed the idea of a military expedition against Japan long before Colonel Neale proposed it to him. 4Nevertheless the establishment of a garrison of English troops at Yokohama was merely delayed by this refusal, and after Sir Rutherford Alcock's return to Japan in the spring of 1864 good reasons were given to the same general why he should change his mind.

5All this time there existed considerable alarm with respect to the aims and intentions of a somewhat mysterious class of Japanese called rônin. 6These were men of the two-sworded class, who had thrown up the service of their daimiôs, and plunged into the political agitations of the time, which had a two-fold object, firstly, to restore the Mikado to his ancient position, or rather to pull down the Tycoon to the same level as the great daimiôs, and secondly, the expulsion of "the barbarians" from the sacred soil of Japan. 7They came principally from the south and west of the country, but there were many from Mito in the east, and a sprinkling from all the other clans. 8About the end of May there was a rumour that they designed to attack Kanagawa, and the Americans still living there were compelled to transfer their residence to Yokohama, not, however, without "compensation for disturbance."

9The Tycoon's people were naturally desirous of doing all that was practicable to conciliate their domestic enemies, and turned such rumours to account in the hope of being able to confine the foreigners at Yokohama within a limited space, such as had formed the prison-residence of the Dutch at Nagasaki in former times. 10Incidents, too, were not wanting of a character to enforce their arguments. 11One of the assistants of the English consulate was threatened with personal violence by a couple of two-sworded men as he was entering a tea-house on the hill at Kanagawa. 12He pulled out his pistol, and pointed it at them, on which they drew back. 13Taking advantage of the opportunity he ran down to the landing-place, where he got a boat and so returned in safety to Yokohama. 14It was reported that the officials at the guardhouse 791 tried to prevent the boatmen from taking him across the bay, but however this may be, they pacified his assailants, one of whom had half-drawn his sword; and in those days we were always told that a samurai might not return his sword to the scabbard without shedding blood, so that the affair was entitled to be ranked as very alarming.

2At the beginning of June, in consequence of a report that half-a-dozen rônins were concealed in the place, the betté-gumi (a body from which the legation guards at Yedo were supplied), together with some drilled troops, came down to Yokohama, and took up their quarters at some newly erected buildings under Nogé hill, and from that date until long after the revolution of 1868 we had constantly a native garrison. 3I recognized among the former several men with whom I had become friends during the visit to Yedo already narrated. 4Fresh additions were made to the British squadron in the shape of two sloops, the "Leopard" and the "Perseus. 5The rumours of warlike operations had died away, and it was given out that the intention of directly enforcing our demands on Satsuma had been abandoned, as the Tycoon had undertaken to see to that part of the business, and it was believed also that to insist upon them at present would give rise to a civil war.

6On the 14^th June there arrived at the legation in Yokohama Kikuchi Iyo no Kami and Shibata Sadatarô, Commissioners for Foreign Affairs, to complete arrangements for paying $440,000 (representing £110,000) in seven instalments extending over six weeks, the first to be delivered on the 18^th. 7But on that day came a note of excuse from one of the Council stating that unavoidable circumstances had arisen which prevented the agreement being carried out, and that he himself would in a day or two arrive at Yokohama to discuss matters with the English Chargé d' Affaires. 8Colonel Neale very properly refused to hold any more communications with the Tycoon's ministers, and after a couple of days' consideration, finally placed the solution in the hands of Admiral Küper. 9The latter, it was said, did not know what to do. 10He had never seen a gun fired in action, and hardly appreciated the Colonel's suggestion that he should at once proceed to seize the steamers lately purchased in such numbers by the Japanese. 11The Council at Yedo now became thoroughly frightened; they had temporized as long as possible, and had worn out the patience of the English authorities. 12But they 801 left no stone unturned to avoid openly giving way, and Ogasawara himself came down to Yokohama to bring the French Chargé d'Affaires and Admiral to intercede. 2The latter, however, refused; insisted on the demands of Great Britain being satisfied, and claimed that the defence of Yokohama should be entrusted to them. 3Ogasawara had just returned from Kiôto with an order from the Tycoon, dictated to him by the Mikado and the anti-foreign element in the ancient capital, to make arrangements with the foreign representatives for closing all the ports! 4For himself he seemed to dislike his instructions, and even gave hints to the French Chargé d'Affaires as to the nature of the reply which had best be given. 5A pageful of notes of exclamation would not be sufficient to express the astonishment of the foreign public of Yokohama when this extraordinary announcement was made, but the presence of the combined squadrons in the harbour relieved them from any anxiety as to the manner in which the diplomatic representatives would reply to it.

6The Japanese Government, having completely failed to persuade the French authorities to intervene on their behalf, which would have indeed been impossible when the request was accompanied by the preposterous demand that foreigners should forthwith clear out of Yokohama, sent a message to Colonel Neale at one a.m. on the morning of the 24^th June to say that the money should be paid, and requesting to be informed at what hour he would receive it. 7The reply was that the original agreement to pay in instalments, having been broken by the Japanese Government, was now null and void, and that the whole must be delivered in the course of the day. 8This was accordingly done; at an early hour carts laden with boxes containing each a couple of thousand dollars began to arrive at the legation. 9All the Chinese shroffs (men employed by merchants and bankers in the Far East to examine coin to see whether it is genuine) were borrowed to do the shroffing and counting. 10The chancery was crowded with the intelligent Chinamen busily employed in clinking one coin against another, and putting them up into parcels, to be replaced in the boxes and carried off on board the squadron. 11The process occupied three days. 12But already on the 24^th Colonel Neale had addressed a letter to the Admiral relieving him of the unwelcome task of undertaking coercive operations.

13The note, dated on the very day on which the indemnity 811 was paid, in which Ogasawara Dzusho no Kami (to give him his full title) had conveyed to Colonel Neale the orders of the Tycoon to close the ports and expel all foreigners from the country, was the first on which I was called to exercise my capacity as a translator. 2Of course I had to get the help of my teacher to read it, but my previous practice in the epistolary style enabled me to understand the construction, and to give a closer version perhaps than either of the others which were prepared in the legation. 3This, to me supremely important, document ran as follows:—

4It is perhaps a little too literal. 5The opening phrase is simply equivalent to the "Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires," and the sentence with which the note concludes is about the same thing as the "assurance of high consideration," which we have borrowed from the French. 6But the rest of it is accurate, and the allusion to the Mikado which appears in the version made from the Dutch translation furnished by the Japanese (vide the Bluebook) had nothing to support it in the original text. 7I cannot forbear from quoting the reply of Colonel Neale, though as far as possible I intend in these "Reminiscences" not to rely on published sources of information. 8It ran thus:—

9Lieutenant-Colonel Neale to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

12What the writer meant by "rational and acceptable means" directed to the end of placing the treaty obligations of Great Britain with Japan on a more "satisfactory and 831 solid footing than heretofore" can only be conjectured. 2I think it is an allusion to the plan that had been mooted of our affording material assistance to the Tycoon in suppressing the opposition of the daimiôs of the west and south to the pro-foreign policy of the Japanese Government, and perhaps to a formal agreement between the Tycoon and the Mikado that the latter should ratify the treaties. 3Certainly the successful execution of such a plan would have placed the Tycoon firmly in the seat of his ancestors, and have forestalled the revolution of 1868 by which his successor was upset, but it would not have been effected without enormous bloodshed, and the Japanese people would have hated the ruler who had called in foreign aid to strengthen his position. 4He could then only have maintained himself there by the adoption of the severest measures of repression, and the nation would have been subjected to a terrible and lasting despotism. 5It is certainly a thing to rejoice at that the Tycoon's council had sufficient patriotism to reject such an offer. 6The Japanese were left to work out their own salvation, and when the revolution did at last break out, the loss of life and property was restricted within narrow limits, while the resulting benefits to the Japanese nation in the establishment of civilized and comparatively free institutions have been such as would have been for ever precluded had the suggestions of certain Europeans been listened to.